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However, when a minor is operating a motor vehicle as in the Betzold
and Dellwo cases, that minor should be judged by the standards of an
adult. 15 The Minnesota Court, in the Dellwo opinion, made a fine state-
ment of reason for the difference.
To give legal sanction to the operation of automobiles by teen-agers with less
than ordinary care for the safety of others is impractical today, to say the
least. We may take judicial notice of the hazards of automobile traffic, the
frequency of accidents, the often catastrophic results of accidents, and the
fact that immature individuals are no less prone to accidents than adults. While
minors are entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with age, experi-
ence, and wisdom when engaged in activities appropriate to their age, ex-
perience, and wisdom, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor in
the operation of a motor vehicle to observe any other standards of care and
conduct than those expected of all others. A person observing children at play
with toys, throwing balls, operating tricycles or velocipedes, or engaged in
other childhood activities may anticipate conduct that does not reach an adult
standard of care or prudence. However, one cannot know whether the operator
of an approaching automobile, airplane, or powerboat is a minor or an adult,
and usually cannot protect himself against youthful imprudence, even if
warned. Accordingly we hold that in the operation of an automobile, airplane,
or powerboat, a minor is to be held to the same standard of care as an adult.16
15Wittmier v. Post, 78 S.D. 520, 105 N.W. 2d 65 (1960) dictum. Also see RESTATE-
MENT OF TORT S, TENTATVE DRAFT No. 4, S 283, comment c.
16 Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 458, 107 N.W. 2d 858, 863 (1961).
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE TRUSTS: ILLEGAL PURPOSE
In his will, the testator set up a trust "to be used for the care, support,
medical attention, education, sustenance, maintenance or custody of such
minor Negro child or children, whose father or mother, or both, have
been incarcerated, imprisoned, detained or committed in any federal, state,
county, or local prison or penitentiary as a result of the conviction of a
crime or misdemeanor of a political nature."' A violation of the Smith
Act2 would constitute such a crime. A grandnephew, hoping to derive
the trust proceeds through the law of intestate succession, now challenges
the validity of the trust. The District Court upheld the Superior Court's
decision that the trust was invalid. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
the order was reversed in favor of the administrator. In Re Robbins'
Estate, 57 Cal. Rep. 2d 765, 371 P. 2d 573 (1962).
1 In re Robbins' Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 765, 766, 371 P. 2d 573 (1962). The Court quotes
from the trust.
2 18 U.S.C. S 2385. This act deals with advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Govern-
ment.
CASE NOTES
As stated in Estate of Henderson.3
A bequest is charitable if: (1) it is made for a charitable purpose; its aims and
accomplishments are of a religious, educational, political or general social in-
terest to mankind. (2) The ultimate recipients constitute either the community
as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion thereof.4
Although the wording may differ in various states, the definition of a
charitable trust remains generally standard.5
Determining this trust in question to be valid, the Court merely applied
the definition of a charitable trust to the facts contained in this case. The
Court held that the provisions of the trust are "unquestionably of social
value. ' 6 It is also evident that the beneficiaries of the trust constitute an
unascertainable portion of the community, thus meeting the second
requirement.
After a close scrutiny of the dissent, the following conclusions can be
made: First, by making no reference to or mention of the majority deci-
sion, the dissent indicates its agreement with all that was contained therein.
Second, the dissent's assertion of additional positive matter is an indication
of its desire to go one step further-to probe deeper into the trust.
In essence, the dissent adds: "[a] trust cannot be created for a purpose
which is illegal. The purpose is illegal if... the trust tends to induce the
commission of crime or if the accomplishment of the purpose is otherwise
against public policy."'7 The Restatement of Trusts states that "a trust
which tends to induce a breach of the criminal law is invalid. Thus, a trust
of property to be applied to the payment of fines of persons convicted of
criminal offenses, such as offenses against the game laws, or traffic laws or
liquor laws, is invalid."
The point of dispute, then, is centered around the purpose of the trust.
Or to state the issue more precisely, what is the purpose of the trust-to
aid the children or to encourage and offer an inducement for violation of
the criminal law?
In support of its decision that the purpose of the trust was to aid the
children, the Court calls attention to the Estate of Butin.9 In this casc
3 17 Cal. 2d 853, 112 P. 2d 605 (1941). 4Id. at 857, 112 P. 2d at 607.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 348, Illinois Annotations (1961).
"A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consist-
ently with existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by
bringing their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their
bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves
for life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening
the burdens of government."
6In re Robbins' Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 765, 770, 371 P. 2d 573, 575 (1962).
7 Id. at 775, 371 P. 2d at 577, quoting from 4 Scott, Trusts § 377 (2d cd. 1956).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS S 377b (1959).
9 81 Cal. App. 2d 76, 183 P. 2d 304 (1947).
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Mary Butin directed her executors to erect a granite tower in the court-
house park. An inscription on the tower was to read, "dedicated to the
memory of all those who during the years 1891 and 19- strove to make
[this] county all that it is."' 0 Following the inscription appears the name
of the deceased and her husband. In its decision the court held:
[I]n determining whether a gift is charitable, the courts look to the nature and
purpose of the gift, rather than to the donor's motives in making it; and hence,
when the nature of the gift is such that it must be deemed to be for a public
purpose, the fact that there is also a private motive in making it does not deprive
the gift of its public character so as to render it noncharitable."
A Pennsylvania Court,12 in a case involving a trust providing for a free
church pew which was intended as a memorial to the testator, stated that
"the true test of a legal public charity is the object sought to be attained;
the purpose to which the money is to be applied; not the motive of the
donor."'1 8 In Woodstown National Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker,14
wherein the testator founded a cemetery as a lasting memorial to himself,
it was stated:
Courts start out with an attitude in favor of the attempt to create a charitable
trust rather than with a hostile attitude toward that attempt. Charity is neces-
sarily altruistic, and it involves the idea of aid or benefit to others, but given
the latter, the motive impelling it is immaterial.'5
The above cases were cited in support of the majority's position that the
purpose was to aid the children though the motive might have been to
induce a breach of the criminal law.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, tacitly attempts to indicate
that the word "purpose" not only means (1) what the trust property is
to be used for, but also (2) the natural result of the use of the trust prop-
erty. This assumption appears evident from the dissent's statement that
"recognition cannot be given to a trust as valid where its purpose is ille-
gal,"' 6 and that "a trust which tends to induce a breach of the criminal law
is invalid."'17
10 Id. at 79, 183 P. 2d at 306.
'lId. at 83, 183 P. 2d at 308, quoting from In re Graves' Estate, 242 Ill. 23, 89 N.E. 672
(1909).
12 Archambault's Estate, 308 Pa. 549, 162 Ad. 801 (1932).
13 Id. at 555, 162 At. at 803 (emphasis added), quoting from Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. 539 (1867).
14 136 N.J. Eq. 62,40 Ad. 2d 222 (1944).
15 Id. at 67,40 Atl. 2d at 224 (Emphasis added).
16 1n re Robbins' Estate, 57 Cal. 2d 765, 775, 371 P. 2d 573, 577 (1962).
17 Id. at 775, 371 P. 2d at 577, quoting from REsrn.: E'r (SI..CONO), TRUSTS § 377 b
(1959).
CASE NOTES
Is the dissent's assumption correct? Does the word "purpose" have
another meaning? To support its position, the minority quotes two early
English cases. The first involved a bequest to purchase the release of per-
sons committed to prison for non-payment of fines under the game laws.'8
The bequest was held illegal since the natural result of the performance
of the trust would be to induce the commission of crime. In the second
case, a bequest to trustees, who were instructed to make seats for poor
people in which to sit while begging by the highway, was held invalid
because such begging was a criminal offense. 19 The above two cases are
the only ones used by the dissent to substantiate its position.
A thorough search of the available authorities reveals but one American
decision in point. This is the case of Jackson v. Phillips20 which involves
certain funds given by the testator to be used to secure the passage of laws
granting women the right to vote; to hold office; to hold, manage and
devise property, and granting them all other civil rights enjoyed by men.
The Court held that the bequest was not for a charitable purpose since
the object of the bequest was to effect a change in existing laws, which
object could not be carried out except by changing the Constitution.
However, the will in the Jackson case also contained another trust; this
one for the benefit of fugitive slaves who escape from the slave-holding
states of the Union. At the time of the testator's death, the Constitution
of the United States declared "no person held to service or labor in one
state shall be discharged therefrom by escaping into another state."'21 As
to these funds, the court said:
[W]hether this bequest is or is not valid is to be ascertained from a fair con-
struction of its language ... by which the court is bound to carry into effect
any charitable bequest in which can be seen a general intention consistent with
the law, even if the particular mode pointed out is illegal, and there is no au-
thority to constitute it to be void if it can be applied in a lawful manner con-
sistently with the intention of the testator as manifested in the words by which
it is expressed.22
It is difficult to reconcile why, under the law which then existed as to
slavery and fugitive slaves, the trust last mentioned should be held valid
and the one pertaining to women suffrage held otherwise. To completely
refute the stand taken in Jackson v. Phillips28 with relation to women
suffrage, an Illinois court in Garrison v. Little,24 wherein similar facts were
concerned, held that a trust to promote women suffrage is not illegal even
Is Thrupp v. Collett, 26 Beav. 125, 53 Eng. Rep. 844 (1858).
19 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS S 377 (2d ed. 1956). 20 96 Mass. 539 (1867).
21 Subsequently abolished by U.S. CONST. AMiain. XIII.
2 2 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 569 (1867) (Emphasis addcd).
23 Id. at 539. 24 75 111. App. 402 (1897).
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though it involves a change in the Constitution, and the change might be
effected through illegal means.
Such an express rejection of the only American case in support of the
dissent should dispel any skepticism there might still be to the stand taken
by the majority of the Court. Finally, the deciding factor that must be
considered in controversial cases involving charitable trusts is that a funda-
mental and established rule of law in Illinois, and in all other jurisdictions,
is that bequests and devises for charitable purposes are looked upon with
favor and all reasonable interpretations and inferences tending to uphold
them are made by the courts.2 5
25 In re Potter's Will, 307 N.Y. 504, 121 N.E. 2d 522 (1954); In re Pierce's Estate, 245
Ia. 22, 60 N.W. 2d 894 (1953); Ervin v. Davis, 355 Mo. 951, 199 S.W. 2d 366 (1947); In
re Porter's Estate, 164 Kan. 92, 187 P. 2d 520 (1947); Caruthers v. Fisk Univ. 394 Ill.
151, 68 N.E. 2d 296 (1946).
